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2 
Abstract 
 
Short-term rentals facilitated by online platforms (like Airbnb) have recently become an object 
of intense debate, leading many city governments to pass new regulations attempting to 
control both their proliferation and platform activities. While these policy responses vary 
greatly from city to city, there is little comparative research to explain this diversity. This paper 
employs a sociological approach to public policy analysis to compare the politicization process, 
collective action around, and regulation of platform-mediated short-term rentals (PM-STR) in 
three cities - Barcelona, Paris and Milan. They were chosen to represent most-dissimilar cases 
in terms of regulatory outputs, both in terms of stringency (weak in Milan, intermediate in 
Paris, strong in Barcelona) and choice of policy sectors (sharing economy and tourism in Milan, 
housing and land use in Paris, urban planning and tourism in Barcelona). Two main findings 
emerged from the comparison. First, the differences between regulations can be explained by 
the type of actors who politicized the issue in the first place and framed it within a specific 
policy sector, the pre-existing policy instruments traditionally used in that sector, and the 
distribution of competences between the city and higher tiers of government. Second, the 
regulations remain continuously subject to intense political mobilisation by six types of actors 
with clashing interests: professional STR operators, associations of hosts or ‘home-sharers’, 
the hotel industry, residents’ associations or citizens’ movements, ‘sharing economy’ 
advocates, and corporate platforms. Each actor constructs different narratives regarding PM-
STR, claiming different types of rights in this contentious politics of regulation. 
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Introduction 
 
In the space of a few years, the impacts of urban tourism - and more broadly of increasing 
transnational mobility flows on urban spaces - have become a highly contentious issue in many 
cities around the world. Citizens’ mobilizations, politicians and academics have started to 
criticise the adverse effects of visitor flows on the transformation of neighbourhoods, housing 
markets and local economies, and on the daily life of long-term residents (Novy and Colomb, 
2016, 2019). The growth of short-term (“holiday”) rentals (STR) has recently become one of 
the most conflictive issues, in part due to its perceived contribution to processes of 
gentrification (Cócola Gant, 2016a; Gravari-Barbas and Guinand, 2017; Cócola Gant and Gago, 
this issue). The proliferation of STR was facilitated by the emergence of new forms of ‘platform 
capitalism’ (Srnicek, 2017) shaped by for-profit online platforms which organise supply and 
demand and take a commission for intermediation – the most well-known being Airbnb.1 The 
issue of platform-mediated short-term rentals (hereafter referred to as PM-STR) has become 
widely discussed in the media and local political arenas. Actors as different as housing activists 
and the hotel industry have begun to challenge the impacts of PM-STR on housing markets, 
residents, and incumbent economic actors. As a result, some city governments have recently 
passed new regulations attempting to control the proliferation of STR and the activities of 
platforms. In the European context, the responses of city governments have been very 
diverse. Some have taken strong regulatory measures to curb or ban the growth of STR, as in 
Berlin, Amsterdam or Barcelona (APUR, 2018). Others have tried to find a middle ground 
between attractiveness to visitors and the protection of residential uses, like in Paris or 
London. A few, like Milan, have opted to tackle the issue through light regulatory approaches 
encouraging the development of the so-called ‘sharing economy’. In some cities, no regulatory 
measures have been adopted, but public demands for regulation have intensified. In some 
cases, national governments have passed new laws, as in the UK and France. How to explain 
such a geographical diversity of reactions, and of subsequent scales and forms of regulation, 
of PM-STR in European cities?  
 
Although now abundant, the existing literature on STR, digital platforms and their impacts on 
cities has taken the “public problem” of PM-STR for granted, and has not engaged much with 
the process of politicization, and the diverse policy responses to these phenomena, in a 
comparative manner. In this paper we seek to explore, and explain, the differences in how the 
“PM-STR problem” has been framed and regulated between different places. We develop a 
framework for understanding differences between local policy responses based on the 
premise that such responses cannot be simply viewed as the result of different structural 
political-economic conditions, but as a product of the struggle between collective actors with 
various interests, modes of action and narratives embedded into place-specific institutional 
arrangements. The paper thus uses a sociological approach to public policy to analyse the 
processes of politicization and collective action around, and different regulations of, PM-STR 
in three large European cities: Barcelona, Paris and Milan. These were chosen to represent 
‘most-dissimilar’ cases in terms of regulatory outputs, both in terms of stringency (weak in 
Milan, intermediate in Paris, strong in Barcelona) and choice of policy sectors (sharing 
economy and tourism in Milan, housing and land use in Paris, and urban planning and tourism 
                                                     
1 Airbnb was created in 2008 in San Francisco as an online platform allowing individual owners/tenants to 
advertise their home, or part thereof, for short-term rental. According to its website, in June 2019 there were 
over 6 million listings in 191 countries.  
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in Barcelona). The policy issue at stake is two-fold: STR themselves, and their mediation 
through new digital platforms which are the vehicle through which the phenomenon has 
become more widespread.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. After briefly reviewing recent scholarship on the impacts of 
PM-STR on cities and introducing our theoretical and analytical framework, in the second part 
we present our comparative methodology and trace the processes of politicization, actors’ 
mobilisation and policy framing in each city. In the third section, we compare those processes 
to explain how and why they have led to a different regulation of PM-STR in each of the three 
cities. We point out, on the one hand, the main factors that can explain these differences and 
on the other, the common features and actors in the contested ‘politics of regulation’.   
 
PM-STR and cities: the need to research politicization, framing and regulation in a 
comparative perspective 
 
The short-term rental of accommodation units to visitors as a commercial activity is not new: 
in most West European countries, this economic activity has been regulated for many years. 
What has turned this practice into an object of controversy is the mutation caused by the 
emergence of digital platforms such as Airbnb, which has encouraged more actors to engage 
in PM-STR. Tourism studies scholars first analysed the changes in individual practices 
generated by this ‘disruptive innovation’ (Guttentag, 2015; Dredge and Gyimóthy, 2017; 
Prayag and Ozanne, 2018). Several practices can be subsumed under the term STR: (i) 
commercial STR of a full unit not normally used as a primary residence; (ii) temporary STR of 
a full unit while the main resident is away; and (iii) rental of a portion of a primary residence 
with the host present (“home-sharing”). The first two are usually the most contentious, while 
the last two are often described as forming part of the ‘collaborative’ or ‘sharing’ economy. 
Regulatory attempts by city governments often apply different rules to each type of practice.  
 
The motivations of STR operators vary, from a desire for inter-cultural exchanges, to a 
household’s need for extra income (Stabrowski, 2017), to the search for high returns by 
speculative actors and multi-property owners. On the demand side, the increasing popularity 
of STR among travellers is due to cost saving and the desire for contact with “locals” 
(Tussyadiah and Pesonen, 2018). Advocates of PM-STR argue that they democratize travel 
through lower costs; generate extra income for households; foster positive social encounters; 
contribute to a better territorial spread of tourist accommodation; and generate “trickle-
down effects” for local economies (Airbnb, 2018). Critics of PM-STR argue that they disturb 
local residents’ life; pose security/safety issues for users; evade taxation; generate unfair 
competition for hotels (Zervas et al., 2017); are no longer part of the “sharing economy” due 
to appropriation by rent-seeking actors (Crommelin et al., 2018; Slee, 2016); entrench socio-
economic and racial inequalities (Schor and Attwood‐Charles, 2017); and generate adverse 
impacts on housing markets and the socio-economic fabric of neighbourhoods.  
 
The latter impacts – caused by STR type (i) – have become particularly contentious: in high-
demand cities, studies have found signs that the proliferation of STR has contributed to a 
decline in the housing stock available for long-term occupation and to an increase of rental 
prices in specific neighbourhoods (e.g. Barron et al., 2017 on the USA; Schäfer and Hirsch, 
2017 on Berlin; Gurran and Phibbs, 2017 on Sydney; Wachsmuth et al., 2017 on Canada). It 
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should be noted, though, that there are complex methodological challenges (which cannot 
not be addressed here) in measuring the impacts of STR on housing markets (Wachsmuth, 
2017; Cócola Gant, 2018). It is also difficult to isolate them from other relevant dynamics and 
factors of urban socio-spatial change, in particular: broader processes of gentrification and 
their multiple causes (Lees et al., 2015); the increasing importance of exchange value over use 
value through the commodification and financialization of housing units (Aalbers, 2016); or 
transnational investments in housing by non-residents as a second home, a ‘safe haven’ or a 
profitable asset (see Paris, 2009 on second home ownership and housing markets; Deverteuil 
and Manley, 2017 on ‘high net-worth individuals’ and ‘pied‐a‐terre urbanism’ in London; 
Mendes, 2018 and Cócola Gant and Gago, this issue on the impact of the Portuguese ‘Golden 
Visa’, foreign investment and rental deregulation policies on the Lisbon housing market). 
 
A review of the scholarly literature on for-profit digital platforms and cities (Artioli, 2018) 
highlighted five emergent themes: the nature and boundaries of platform-mediated 
exchanges; their size and socio-economic organisation; their income and spatial distributional 
effects; their effects on existing markets; and, to a lesser extent, their regulation and 
governance. The issue of regulation was first addressed by American legal scholars who 
analysed how local zoning codes and ordinances have been used (and challenged) to regulate 
STR (e.g. Gottlieb, 2013; Palombo, 2015; Widener, 2015). Those approaches tend, however, 
not to tackle the political and social struggles that emerge around regulation. One exception 
stems from Pollman and Barry (2017), who offer an interesting conceptualisation of corporate 
platforms as ‘regulatory entrepreneurs’ striving to influence the public regulation of their 
activities. In critical urban studies, some authors have highlighted the role played by 
transnational corporate platforms in urban politics and public policy, epitomized by the 
campaigning activities of Airbnb in San Francisco in 2015 against the so-called “Proposition F” 
intended to limit PM-STR (McNeill, 2016; Stabrowski, 2017; Sharp, 2018). More recently, 
planning scholars have investigated how local planning policies have responded to PM-STR 
(Gurran and Phibbs, 2017; Gurran, 2018; Holman et al., 2018; Ferreri and Sanyal, 2018; 
Leshinsky and Schatz, 2018), showing that traditional zoning or land use regulatory 
mechanisms are not very effective. 
 
Building on this growing body of scholarship, we argue that the socio-political struggles, forms 
of collective action, agenda-setting and policy framing processes around the regulation of PM-
STR have been relatively overlooked. Moreover, existing studies tend to focus on one city 
(exceptions being Dredge et al., 2016; Smorto, 2016; Wegmann and Jiao, 2017; Crommelin et 
al., 2018; Nieuwland and van Melik, 2018). Fine-grained comparative approaches are needed 
to develop explanations about the differences in local political responses to transnational 
‘shared shocks’ like the advent of Uber or Airbnb, which are often ‘refracted into divergent 
struggles over particular national practices’ (Locke and Thelen, 1995: 338). Some political 
scientists and sociologists have started to explore the comparative politics of the platform 
economy and its regulation, in particular Thelen (2018) on Uber and Courmont (2018) on 
Waze, but to our knowledge there are no comparative studies of the local politics and 
regulatory policies surrounding PM-STR yet.  
 
We seek to bridge this gap by adopting a comparative, sociological approach to public policy, 
rooted in the basic postulate that political ‘problems’ result from social and political 
constructions relative in time and space (Becker, 1963). This underpins various approaches to 
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policy studies developed over the past decades by North American and European scholars as 
an alternative to the dominance of rational choice theory in policy analysis (Fischer, 2003). 
Accordingly, public policies are devised in response to a ‘public problem’ of a perceived 
collective nature, which is discursively constructed by political authorities and various social 
actors to justify some form of intervention. This process is underpinned by ‘policy narratives’ 
(Radaelli, 1999), i.e. a set of legitimizing arguments providing a rationale and framing of ‘public 
problems’ developed by specific actors. These narratives sometimes invoke specific collective 
or individual rights that constitute the foundation of public claims about regulation, as we will 
see. 
 
In our analysis, we develop a careful examination of the social struggles which make PM-STR 
become a political issue in particular cities, and push governments to design public policies. 
These struggles contribute to open a ‘public arena’ in which actors (or coalitions) try to impose 
one particular policy framing – namely a particular definition of the problem (diagnostic) and 
expected solutions (prognostic) (Cress and Snow, 2000) – with the goal to shape the form and 
content of public policies. However, this process - from framing to agenda-setting and policy 
design – is never linear. First, some actors can mobilize resources to obstruct it in order to 
preserve their own interests and avoid regulation (Cobb and Ross, 1997). Second, in many 
policy fields, the framing can be shaped by pre-existing policy programs and instruments (Rose 
and Davies, 1994). More generally, a government’s capacity to develop policies is shaped by 
the broader institutional arrangements that define the distribution of power and competences 
across various levels and branches of government (Hall, 1986). As we will see, policy 
instruments which existed before the birth of digital platforms matter, because policies entail 
some ‘recycling’ and are rarely pure innovations (Hood, 1983). Finally, our study takes into 
account the ‘trans-sectorial’ dimension of PM-STR, a phenomenon at the crossroads between 
different policy sectors within the remit of different administrative departments – housing, 
land use planning, economic development and tourism. In each sector, well-established actors 
defend situated interests with potentially contradictory goals. This requires an analysis of the 
competition around the assignment of the policy issue of PM-STR to an existing sector, or, by 
contrast, of the emergence of new cross-sectoral policies or autonomization of a new sector. 
Governing new issues in a cross-sectoral way can be heavily constrained by existing 
administrative divisions and routines (Muller, 1985), or can become an opportunity to 
transform existing sectors and experiment with new instruments. 
 
Our approach to the regulation of PM-STR in European cities does not discard the possible 
influence of different structural socio-economic conditions as sources of variation in local 
political responses between cities. There is no doubt that the intensity of tourism pressures 
may influence the saliency of the issue on local agendas, and the overall increase and 
geographical spread of STR in a particular city. Equally, the scarcity of affordable housing, or 
the quantity of social housing available in a given place, shapes the way in which social 
movements and politicians may consider PM-STR as a threat to the capacity of local residents 
to ‘stay put’ in their city. However, our postulate is that these conditions are not the main, or 
sole, factors to explain the processes of politicization of PM-STR - the focus of this paper. If the 
quantitative importance of tourist flows was the main explanatory variable, one would expect 
massive grassroots and political mobilisations against mass tourism in Paris - the most visited 
city in the world - that would frame the PM-STR issue through this lens, as has been the case 
in Barcelona (Novy and Colomb, 2016). As we will see, this was not the case in Paris. The 
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intuitive argument assuming that the presence of strong social movements (combined with 
an electoral window) is a key factor to explain the quick and strong politicization of PM-STR, 
which works for Barcelona, does not apply to Paris. Equally, one may hypothesize that the 
defence of the right to rent one’s home might be more vocally mobilized in all Southern 
European cities where there is a high rate of homeownership, and where the negative effects 
of the post-2008 recession on residents’ income have been strongly felt. The significant 
differences between the Barcelona and Milan cases, outlined below, contradict this 
hypothesis. Paying attention to actors’ resources, modes of framing, narratives, incentives and 
power positions in a given context is thus fundamental, as these actors constitute the agency 
that give meaning and priority to particular structural conditions (e.g. in relation to tourism, 
housing or economic development) and eventually emphasize them (or not), always 
selectively, for policy development. As Thelen shows in her comparative study of the 
responses to the emergence of the transportation platform Uber in the United States, 
Germany, and Sweden, reactions can vary ‘from welcome embrace and accommodating 
regulatory adjustments to complete rejection and legal bans’ (2018: 938), because the 
regulatory tensions that a platform provokes in different countries ‘mobilize different actors, 
inspire the formation of different coalitions, and shape the terms on which conflicts over Uber 
are framed and fought’ (Ibid.). 
 
How PM-STR became a policy issue in European cities: the cases of Barcelona, Paris and 
Milan   
 
In this comparison we seek to explore, and explain, the differences in how the “PM-STR 
problem” has been framed and regulated in different cities. Through a ‘variation‐finding' 
approach, we seek to ‘establish a principle of variation in the character or intensity of a 
phenomenon by examining systematic differences between instances’ (Tilly, 1984: 82). We 
seek to uncover pluralist causalities (Pickvance, 2001) to explain how and why a cross-cutting 
global phenomenon affecting many cities produces different outcomes on the ground, thus 
contributing to ongoing debates about international comparison in urban studies (Robinson, 
2011). The theoretical, conceptual and methodological premise of the paper is that we need 
to pay attention to social and political processes to understand differences between cities – 
how and why particular socio-political struggles arise and develop in particular places - and 
not in others - around a similar urban ‘issue’, and which kind of policy regulations are adopted.  
 
Our three-stage comparative research design was shaped by this aim. First, we selected what 
appeared to be three ‘most-dissimilar’ cases in terms of regulatory outputs. The focus of our 
cases, rather than the city itself, is the politicization process and formation of local collective 
action around the regulation of PM-STR in a particular place. Our case sampling was based on 
the dependent variable, i.e. the diversity of regulations that have been adopted, in order to 
answer the question: why cities have adopted such diverse forms of regulation, while facing 
the same phenomenon induced by similar firms? Among a sample of thirteen European cities 
we have been working on for a comparative research project on the regulation of PM-STR, for 
this article we chose to focus on Barcelona, Paris and Milan. These three cities are comparable 
in terms of area, density, importance in national contexts (as national or regional capitals), 
but face different structural conditions in terms of economy, tourism pressures, and housing 
market conditions (see Table 1). We chose these three cities because, at the end of the 
exploratory phase of the project in 2016 (which entailed a review of recent local and national 
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media coverage of debates around PM-STR, and of the content of emerging regulations), they 
appeared to be the most dissimilar cases in terms of the types of regulation of PM-STR, both 
in terms of the level of stringency (weak in Milan, intermediate in Paris, strong in Barcelona) 
and choice of policy sectors (sharing economy and tourism in Milan, housing and land use in 
Paris, urban planning and tourism in Barcelona), as will be shown. 
 
Table 1. Context of the three cities: key facts and figures 
 
Second, we conducted detailed case-studies in each city to trace the mechanisms and 
processes of politicization and agenda-setting, and the actors involved in collective action 
around the issue of the regulation of PM-STR. Extensive documentary research was carried 
out (keyword searches in local and national media; analysis of transcripts of political debates, 
policy documents, and interest group statements), sometimes complemented by observation 
of public events. Through this, we identified who were the vocal interest groups and actors 
that publicly expressed a position on the issue and what their claims were. We then carried 
out approximately 15 semi-structured interviews in each city between 2016 and mid-2018 
with representatives of those interest groups, who themselves named other relevant actors 
to interview through a snowballing technique. Interviewees were asked about their 
organisation’s position, claims and activities about PM-STR regulation, and about their 
relationships with other actors. 
 
Thirdly, by comparing the three case-studies, we identified in an inductive way the key 
variables that seem to explain the differences in regulatory outputs. The combination of a 
case-oriented and a variable-oriented approach makes it possible to develop a comparison 
respectful of the intricacy of each case while explaining differences and commonalities. 
 
Barcelona: grassroots mobilisations and new municipal agenda  
 
The case of Barcelona illustrates in an emblematic way how grassroots social mobilisations 
can politicize the issue of PM-STR. In the early 2000s, residents’ associations in the historic 
district of Ciutat Vella began to denounce the nuisances caused by ‘tourist apartments’. The 
number of STR in Barcelona sharply increased in the 2010s, fuelled by online platforms and by 
a 2012 decree by the Catalan regional government (which is responsible for setting the 
definition of STR as an economic activity), which created a light licensing system for 
‘accommodation for touristic use’ (type (i) and (ii)). In the most affected districts, residents’ 
associations began to convene public meetings to raise awareness of the problems generated 
by STR, lobby local councillors for action, and report illegal STR - often in vain. The Federation 
of Residents’ Associations of Barcelona (FAVB) subsequently made the topic of tourism a key 
element of its campaigns, and STR became problematized within a broader critique of the 
negative effects of mass tourism on the city’s physical and socio-economic fabric. Residents’ 
concerns were increasingly mentioned in the local media, albeit in very different ways. They 
sometimes received sympathetic coverage, but more often than not, were criticized for being 
‘anti-tourism’ (Milano, 2017) by various stakeholders who did not accept any challenge to the 
tourism sector - an undisputed cornerstone of the economic development strategy of 
successive municipal governments since the 1992 Olympic Games. 
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Demands for STR control measures first found echo at the district level. In Ciutat Vella, a Pla 
d’Usos was approved in 2010 to regulate the opening and location of economic activities, and 
set a moratorium on new hotels and STR licenses. At the city-wide level, however, the political 
response was weak until 2014. In August of that year, a small incident received a lot of media 
attention and marked a turning point: three male tourists wandered around naked during 
daytime in the neighbourhood of La Barceloneta, unstopped by the police and causing 
outrage. Residents’ associations organised vocal street protests to demand a stronger 
regulation of the city’s tourism economy, and of STR in particular, under the motto “Barcelona 
is not for sale”. The reaction of the then centre-right city government was to freeze new STR 
licenses and promise more inspectors to control illegal STR - a few months before municipal 
elections were due in May 2015. 
  
The window of opportunity created by the local electoral campaign was seized by activists to 
shape the political agenda in a context where tourism had eventually become a public, 
contested issue. The FAVB prepared a list of demands about the regulation of tourism which 
was sent to all political parties, including a moratorium on new licenses for all forms of tourism 
accommodation. The left-wing citizen platform Guanyem Barcelona (created in June 2014 to 
run for the municipal elections, and rooted in the social movements that stemmed from the 
“15M” mobilizations – Eizaguirre et al., 2017) took many of those demands on board in its 
manifesto. In the spring of 2015, residents’ associations and grassroots organisations formed 
a city-wide network (Assemblea de Barris per un Turisme Sostenible, ABTS) to counteract what 
they perceived as a “hegemonic” narrative on the role of tourism in the city. The fight against 
STR is a core element of its campaigns. The network is led by articulate activists who frame 
their concerns within a broader critique of Barcelona’s urban development model, well aware 
that it is impossible to separate the effects of tourism from those of other processes driving 
neighbourhood change (e.g. lack of rent control, insufficient social housing, and speculative 
real estate practices). The framing of the “problem” of STR was no longer simply in terms of 
nuisances, but also of structural impacts on the housing market and on population decline 
(Cócola Gant, 2016b). Yet the arguments of the ABTS were opposed by professional STR 
operators, platform representatives, as well as individual residents occasionally engaged in 
STR practices. At local public meetings, tensions and disagreements around the issue were 
often palpable. 
  
In May 2015, the citizen platform Guanyem Barcelona – renamed Barcelona en Comú – won 
a tight victory in the municipal elections, winning 11 out of 41 seats. Its figurehead - former 
housing activist Ada Colau - became Barcelona’s new mayor. Among other themes, Barcelona 
en Comú promised to improve access to housing and change the city’s urban development 
model, including a better regulation of tourism (Colau, 2014; Russo and Scarnato, 2018). 
Unsurprisingly, the implementation of this agenda proved challenging, given the minority 
position of the new political force in a politically-fragmented city council. Nevertheless, in July 
2015 a one-year moratorium on new hotels and STR licenses was voted, while a plan 
regulating tourist accommodation would be prepared by the Urban Planning department. The 
Special Plan for Tourist Accommodation (PEUAT) was approved in January 2017 to reconcile 
four explicit rights - to housing, to rest and privacy, to sustainable mobility and to a healthy 
environment (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2017). The plan is based on the principle of ‘zero 
growth’ of the total number of STR in the city, and aims to re-balance the territorial 
distribution of STR away from over-congested areas through a zoning system which bans new 
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STR licenses in central areas, and allows a replacement, or modest growth, in other. The 
approval of the PEUAT, and the noticeable strengthening of enforcement measures that has 
accompanied it, were met with polarized reactions from the diverse actors involved in the 
debates on PM-STR, as discussed later. The regulation does not include ‘home-sharing’ in a 
strict sense (type (iii)). However, a new regulation was drafted by the Catalan government in 
2016 to create a legal definition for home-sharing which, if eventually passed, will give city 
councils the discretion to create local regulations of this sub-type of STR through the existing 
licensing and land use planning system.   
 
Paris: the key role of local officials - housing versus tourism, city versus central state  
  
The case of Paris illustrates a different framing process - one heavily shaped by local officials 
and marked by tensions between policy sectors and scales of government. While PM-STR were 
initially seen as an economic opportunity to foster tourism attractiveness, the issue was 
reframed by the Deputy-Mayor for Housing as a problem that undermines the objectives of 
the housing policies implemented by the Socialist Party which has governed the city since 
2001.  
 
The category of short-term ‘furnished tourist rentals’ (type (i)) had been regulated in France 
since the 1960s in various legal texts (e.g. the Code of Tourism and Code of Urban Planning). 
In Paris, as renting out a property under that regime has been more profitable than renting 
out for a longer period, many property owners turned to that activity. The municipal 
government had been concerned about this for some time. To carry out this activity in large 
French cities, since 2005 a national law requires an official declaration of change of use from 
‘residential’ to ‘commercial’, which is subject to authorization by the municipal government 
and to a ‘compensation rule’ (namely the compulsory provision of equivalent residential 
floorspace elsewhere in the city). These rules existed before the birth of platforms, but were 
not well publicised and hardly implemented. In 2011, two reports highlighted the adverse 
impacts caused by the rapid development of PM-STR (Gadeix, 2011; APUR, 2011) - illegalities, 
possible scams for tourists, nuisances for residents, and impacts on the housing market – and 
warned against Paris becoming a city for tourists rather than residents.  
 
The city government consequently adopted a dual attitude. On the one hand, from 2013 
onwards, the Housing Department - via the Office for Housing Protection - toughened controls 
on the ‘change of use’ and ‘compensation’ provisions and began to fine non-compliant 
landlords. On the other hand, the city government did not publicly put the issue on the 
political agenda until 2015, while platforms were increasing their offer in Paris at an 
exponential rate. The Department for Tourism and Economic Development saw this 
phenomenon as an opportunity to foster tourism attractiveness, while public opinion viewed 
it as a way for Paris residents to earn additional income - for type (ii) and (iii) - in one of the 
most expensive cities in the world. Unlike Barcelona, there have not been visible grassroots 
mobilizations in Paris against the impacts of tourism or gentrification. Criticisms against 
particular impacts of tourism came, rather, from upper middle-class associations in specific 
neighbourhoods (Gravari-Barbas and Jacquot, 2016). Since 2014, some of these associations 
have gradually embedded the issue of PM-STR into claims related to heritage conservation, 
quality of life, and local housing markets. The second wave of criticisms against PM-STR came 
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from the hotel industry, which saw them as unfair competition and became more vocal at the 
same time as the mobilization of taxi drivers against Uber Pop in France in 2014 and 2015.  
 
The year 2015 marked a turning point: PM-STRs emerged onto the local political agenda and 
were reframed as a housing issue by the municipal government after a conflict with the 
tourism department. As public debates around the negative effects of PM-STR were growing 
in other American and European cities, the Deputy-Mayor of Paris in charge of Cultural Affairs 
(Bruno Julliard, from the Socialist Party) invited the CEO of Airbnb, Brian Chesky, to the City 
Hall, to discuss the possibility of Airbnb collecting the city’s tourist tax via its platform. 
However, the cordial tone of that meeting was brushed aside by the Deputy-Mayor for 
Housing (Ian Brossat, from the Communist Party) who reframed the issue of PM-STR as a 
housing problem. He pushed for a stronger display of municipal regulatory action, and shortly 
afterwards ordered a heavy control and enforcement action against illegal STR which received 
a lot of media coverage. Back then, the ‘public problem’ of PM-STR was not attributed to 
Airbnb or to tourists themselves, but to hosts who operate several properties, through a 
discursive cleavage between the “good” hosts (involved in home-sharing or the occasional 
renting of their primary residence, i.e. type (ii) and (iii)), and the “bad” ones driven by 
speculative goals (type (i)). Aligning with its middle class political clientele, the municipal 
government thus positioned itself against real estate speculation, but without condemning 
home-sharing as a practice. A new set of compromise rules were agreed upon, allowing 
individuals, after registration with the city administration, to rent their primary residence for 
up to 120 days per year without the need for a ‘change of use’ authorization needed for type 
(i). Short-term subletting by a tenant without authorization from the landlord, multi-listings, 
and PM-STR in social housing, are all prohibited. At the same time the door was left open to 
negotiate with Airbnb: in October 2016, the city government reached a tax collection 
agreement with the platform. 
 
In parallel, the Paris government made repeated demands on the central government for a 
national regulation of platforms. Following a Parliamentary report arguing that the 
‘collaborative economy’ was both an economic opportunity and a risk (Terrasse, 2016), the 
national “Law for a Digital Republic” was voted in October 2016. It allows cities over 200,000 
inhabitants to require platforms to include a compulsory registration number in hosts’ listings. 
However, the French Government – afraid of possible challenges in the European Court of 
Justice – did not sign the enforcement decree for some of the Law’s provisions (particularly 
those asking platforms to share hosts’ data with public authorities), following lobbying 
pressures from Airbnb and the European Holidays Home Association. A new national law on 
housing was voted in April 2018, which allows stronger sanctions against non-compliant 
platforms – but has not yet been validated by the government. At the national level, the 
overall framing of PM-STR, at the time of writing, was dominated by an economic rationale 
(influenced by the Ministry of Economy and by President Macron) rather than a housing 
protection rationale (upheld by the Ministry of Housing).  
   
Milan: the parallel mobilisation of ‘sharing economy’ advocates and the hotel industry  
 
Milan is a case where PM-STRs were first framed as an economic opportunity driven by the 
new ‘sharing’ economy, in the context of a political consensus around the desirable growth of 
the visitor economy. The regulatory initiatives by both the city and regional governments have 
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been focused on economic development (in combination with social and redistributional 
objectives for the municipal government) and on the reduction of informality and tax evasion 
in relation to PM-STR, while national policy-making on the issue has been limited and 
exclusively tax-related. 
 
In Milan, the first group to mobilise around PM-STR was a coalition of ‘sharing economy’ 
advocates set up in the run-up to the World Expo held in the city in 2015. In November 2013, 
during the first edition of the festival for the sharing economy “Sharitaly”, 14 experts 
advocated the integration of the sharing economy into the upcoming mega-event, to 
transform Milan into a “Sharing City”. These recognised experts belonged to well-established 
organisations in the city, including a major non-profit foundation, consultancy and university, 
and had strong individual ties with the city government. In their project (Sharexpo, 2014), six 
sectors (accommodation, mobility, working spaces, personal services and care, food, and 
culture) were taken as the starting points for the creation of a city-wide network of sharing 
services. Throughout 2014, this group, organised in the “Sharexpo” committee, played a key 
role in the emergence of the municipal “Milano Sharing City” policy, through public 
dissemination events and contacts with local policy-makers. The ‘sharing economy’ was 
therefore integrated into the agenda of the centre-left city government (in power since 2011 
after 18 years of right-wing rule), around the goal of combining economic growth with social 
inclusion through new technologies (Gascó et al., 2016), public participation and service co-
production (Pais et al., forthcoming). The document “Milano Sharing City” was approved in 
December 2014 (Comune di Milano, 2014), spelling out a policy strategy for supporting new 
public and private sharing services and products in a more sustainable and inclusive economy 
(Mazzucotelli and Pais, 2017; Bernardi and Diamantini, 2016). 
 
Three main characteristics of this municipal policy can be pointed out. First, it recalled the 
theorisations of the ‘sharing economy’ in its initial “golden age”, defined as a new form of 
interpersonal exchanges that activate idle or underused resources and establish new social 
relations, forms of reciprocity and personal ties (Botsman and Rogers, 2011). Second, it had a 
cross-sectoral scope that cut through traditional policy fields: it was supported by three 
deputy-mayors - in charge of Employment and Economic Development, Mobility, and 
Commerce - who mobilized relevant actors (associations, profit and non-profit companies, 
etc.) to bring their activities and products into a coherent framework through network 
building. Third, in this context PM-STR were seen as only one of the various expressions of the 
‘sharing economy’ (i.e. type (ii) and (iii)), and the platform Airbnb was considered as one of its 
operators. The company participated in the Milan Sharing City consultations and joined the 
municipally-labelled ‘network of sharing economy operators’ in 2015. A memorandum of 
understanding was signed between Airbnb and the municipality in November 2015, which 
included four types of actions: enhancement of the digital literacy of disadvantaged citizens; 
impact measurement from Airbnb; collaboration for increasing the accommodation offer 
during big events; and support for the implementation of the legal and tax rules defined by 
the recently approved Regional Law, expected to lead to the online collection of the tourist 
tax by the platform. 
 
In parallel, a second and very different process of issue-framing and agenda-setting took place 
at the regional level, where PM-STR have been framed as a new, and largely informal, type of 
tourist accommodation. In 2015, the elaboration of a new regional law on tourism was 
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triggered by the upcoming World Expo, with the aim of updating norms and stimulating 
tourism flows to the region. This opened a window of opportunity for the hotel industry to 
put the STR issue on the regional agenda, pushing for stricter legal norms and harder controls 
on STR. Their much-repeated slogan was “same market, same rules” (tax, quality, safety rules, 
etc.). They also criticised the term “sharing” for misrepresenting the full-time operation of 
many STR (type (i)) - to them, an irregular and unfair form of competition. In Milan, these 
economic actors are organised in well-established associations (Associazione Provinciale 
Albergatori Milano, Associazione Turismo e Ricettività and Assolombarda). Their actions 
targeted politicians and top civil servants (with whom they have well established ties), but 
also entailed active public campaigning through local media interventions, public conferences, 
reports, and the creation of an advocacy website, “HotelvsAirbnb”. 
 
The new regional law was approved in October 2015 by the ruling right-wing majority led by 
a Northern League governor, with no coordination with the city of Milan. As PM-STR did not 
fit any of the existing types of tourist accommodation, the law introduced a new category for 
PM-STR - the “Case e Appartamenti per Vacanza”, subject to requirements similar to those 
applying to Bed&Breakfast establishments, and applying to types (i), (ii) and (iii). The law was 
modified in January 2018 with the introduction of a compulsory identification number for 
landlords (starting from September 2018), a demand coming from the hotel industry. While 
these rules were criticised by both Airbnb and property-owners associations, the regional 
government defended the law not as an attempt to ban PM-STR, but to make this economic 
activity legal, measurable, taxable and safe, and to re-establish a fair competition with hotels. 
On the ground of this framing focused on legality and tourist tax collection, the municipal and 
regional governments have eventually started to cooperate since the end of 2016. 
 
The politicization of PM-STR, actors’ mobilisation and the contested politics of regulation: a 
comparative analysis  
 
This section compares the results of the three case-studies first, to explain the different 
processes and factors that have led to different types of regulations; second, to analyse how 
the enacted regulations (their legitimacy, degree of stringency and instruments) have been 
the object of intense political mobilisation by different types of organised urban actors with 
clashing interests and narratives regarding the urban land use and the economic activity 
represented by PM-STR. 
 
Explaining the adoption of different regulations: actors, multi-level governance, instruments  
 
Three main factors emerge from the comparison to explain the variations in the regulations: 
the type of actors who politicized the issue in the first place, the distribution of competences 
between scales of government and the existing instruments available to the city 
administration. In Table 2 we show the types of actors centrally involved in the politicization 
and framing of PM-STR: in Barcelona, residents’ associations and new grassroots movements 
against gentrification and touristification; in Paris, the hotel industry and the city 
government’s housing officials - against officials from the tourism and economic development 
sectors; in Milan, ‘sharing economy’ advocates (at the local level) and the hotel industry 
(mostly at the regional level) in the context of an overall consensus favourable to tourism 
growth.  
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Table 2: Actors involved in the politicization and framing of PM-STR  
 
Importantly, the dominant actors active in framing the issue of PM-STR in each city (indicated 
with ++ in Table 2) have mobilized in an already institutionalized political space where policy 
makers have to deal with many problems. These actors therefore play a crucial role in coupling 
the framing of PM-STR with pre-existing issues that have been high on the broader political 
agenda – which are themselves the result of socio-political framing processes. In Barcelona, 
after May 2015 the governance of tourism and the ‘right to housing’ became central objectives 
of the new municipal government led by Barcelona en Comú, which sought to respond to 
grassroots’ discontent about mass tourism and demarcate themselves from the previous 
centre-right government. By contrast, in Paris, mass tourism has not been politicized. The 
agenda-setting came from within the local government, with an unexpected alliance between 
local housing officials and the hotel industry who agreed on the need to regulate PM-STR with 
two different objectives (affordable housing protection vs preventing unfair competition). The 
city government also decided to regulate PM-STR because the central state did not: the local 
agenda must be understood through the lens of a historical conflict between the City of Paris 
and the French state. In Milan, the regional and municipal governments had pro-tourism 
agendas before the emergence of PM-STR. Regulatory initiatives were triggered by the World 
Expo 2015, to update norms in a light way to support tourism while addressing tax evasion 
and informality. At the municipal level, the PM-STR issue was anchored in a broader agenda 
for economic development and social inclusion through the promotion of the ‘sharing 
economy’. At the time when regulations were passed, tourism flows were not considered 
significant enough to be an issue, and there was no problematization of a ‘housing crisis’ 
related to PM-STR in Milan.   
 
As shown in Table 3, these framing processes have led to various modes of regulation with 
different levels of stringency. The framing and the policy sector in which the ‘public problem’ 
is located partly shape the way rules are enacted, but this is not the sole explanatory factor of 
variation. The latter also depends on the existing competences of the city government in 
relation to other tiers of government and the bargaining between them. In all three cases, it 
is either the regional government (Catalonia, Lombardy) or the national government (France) 
which has competence over the legal definition of tourism-related establishments, not the 
city governments. There may be tensions, or a lack of cooperation, between and within those 
different tiers vis-à-vis the need to regulate PM-STR. This may be due to ideological differences 
between the ruling parties at the regional and local level (with centre-right parties governing 
Lombardy and Catalonia and left-wing governments in Milan and Barcelona) and at the 
national and local level (in France). This may also be caused by tensions and unequal power 
relations between various sectorial administrations (e.g. the Ministry of Economy in France, 
which dominates the Ministry of Housing). One crucial element is whether regional or national 
legislation defines (different subtypes of) STR as an economic/commercial activity different 
from a residential use, thus potentially subject to an authorisation, registration or licensing 
system. If so, this gives scope for municipal governments to ‘customise’ the higher-tier rules 
and enact more stringent STR regulations using their competence over local land use planning 
to regulate changes of uses (Paris) or the granting of new licenses (Barcelona).  
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Finally, the third factor shaping the adopted regulations are the existing policy instruments 
traditionally used in the sector(s) chosen to intervene (namely the ‘compensation system’ for 
‘change of use’ in Paris; land use planning in Barcelona; the legal qualification of the types of 
tourist accommodation in Milan). These instruments are recycled, stretched or adapted to 
grasp different types of PM-STR. In Barcelona, the PEUAT was elaborated as a special planning 
document to avoid the lengthy process of modifying the General Metropolitan Plan, and some 
innovations in enforcement were devised (see Table 3). In Paris, existing instruments have 
been recycled with minor innovations, and given more visibility through a stricter 
enforcement of the long-existing national legislation on furnished tourist rentals. The Milan 
city government has, by contrast, developed a rather innovative, multi-sectorial ‘sharing 
economy’ policy agenda, but enacted only a light regulation of PM-STR (shaped by regional 
legislation).  
 
Table 3: The regulation of PM-STR in Barcelona, Paris and Milan (as of June 2019)   
 
After their adoption, the implementation of the new regulations – an aspect which cannot be 
developed in this paper – is highly challenging. As noted by other scholars, enforcing 
regulation is very difficult, as public authorities have limited capacity for the inspection of STR 
uses (Leshinsky and Schatz, 2018). The governments of the three cities have dedicated starkly 
different amounts of resources to that task (see Table 3). More crucially, city governments 
lack access to the data that would allow them to identify who exactly is offering a STR on a 
digital platform, in what capacity, at which precise location and for what amount of time, as 
most platforms have refused to communicate such personal data to public authorities 
(invoking European data protection legislation).  
 
The contentious politics of regulation and the reconfiguration of collective action: competing 
actors, interests and narratives  
 
In all three cities, the controversies around the adoption of PM-STR regulations have thus 
continued after their enactment. The mechanisms and legitimacy of the new regulations are 
at the core of intense debates: interest groups challenge the rules, seek to change them in 
directions that are favourable to their interests, or try to avoid compliance. Our empirical 
analysis identified six types of interest groups involved in the contentious politics of PM-STR 
regulations: the professional organisations representing the operators of legal, commercial 
STR; new associations of ‘hosts’ or of ‘home-sharers’; the hotel industry; residents’ 
associations; ‘sharing economy advocates’; and corporate platforms.  While some are old and 
well-established (such as hotel industry associations), others have emerged with the 
development of PM-STR and have become new and powerful urban actors (such as hosts’ 
associations or platforms themselves). Interestingly, some unlikely discursive alliances have 
emerged between very different or traditionally opposed actors (e.g. hotel industry 
associations and grassroots movements), sometimes leading to actual collaboration for ad hoc 
actions.  
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Figure 1 represents this contentious politics by summarizing the six types of actors, and the 
clashing ‘rights’ which they claim in their policy narratives for or against regulation.2 The 
horizontal axis represents the tension between those narratives emphasizing PM-STR as an 
economic activity (which should or should not be subject to licensing, fair competition or 
market access rules, taxation and other constraints), and those focusing on STR as a residential 
unit (which should or should not be regulated in relation to other land uses, with reference to 
‘public interest’ considerations which may justify limiting private property rights). The vertical 
axis represents the tension between those narratives prioritizing the exchange value of PM-
STR as a profit-making activity relying on a commodity to be exchanged according to supply 
and demand, and those defending the use value of residential units against their conversion 
into STR, or advocating the social and collective benefits of the practice of sharing one’s home 
(as per the spirit of the early ‘sharing economy’ movement).   
 
Figure 1. Competing actors around the regulation of PM-STR: clashing policy narratives and rights 
 
The six types of actors and their claims are as follows: 
 
1) The professional organisations representing the operators of legal, commercial STR or 
property managers (APARTUR in Barcelona, SPLM in Paris, Rescasa in Milan) tend to 
declare themselves favourable to some regulation and call for strong enforcement 
measures that protect them from the competition from their “illegal” STR-operating 
counterparts. At the same time, they firmly oppose any regulatory attempt to curb or 
slow the STR market and their entrepreneurial activities (such as the overall ‘zero 
growth’ in STR licences set by the Barcelona PEUAT).  
 
2) New associations of hosts or of ‘home-sharers’ (ProLocaTur, Host Italiani, Home 
Sharing Club Milano, and then OspitaMi and Hospres in Milan, Plataforma Pro 
Viviendas Turísticas and Veïns i Amfitrions in Barcelona, Home Sharing Club Paris in 
Paris), while diverse in their composition (some representing ‘home-sharers’ in the 
strict sense, i.e. type (ii) and (iii), some representing individual operators of full STR 
units, i.e. type (i)), have been very vocal against new (or prospective) regulations, 
which they describe as limiting their individual right to rent/share in a context of 
austerity and/or to freely use their property. This type includes the so-called “Home 
sharing clubs” whose creation was encouraged by Airbnb.  
 
3) By contrast, the hotel industry systematically supports a tougher approach to PM-STR 
in the three cities, seeing PM-STR as ‘unfair competition’ and demanding that they be 
subject to the same set of rules that apply to hotels, to uphold the principles of a ‘level-
playing field’. In the three cities they draw material, financial and legitimacy resources 
from being part of larger national business- and hotel federations. 
 
4) Many residents’ associations (in Paris, mostly middle-class, quality-of-life focused; in 
Barcelona, more heterogeneous and in cooperation with other grassroots movements 
such as the ABTS and housing activists) support the new regulatory measures, in the 
                                                     
2 The word ‘right’ has been explicitly used by some actors in policy documents or interviews (e.g. the city 
administration in Barcelona; or Airbnb and home-sharing associations). Other actors referred to broader 
principles like ‘free enterprise’ or ‘fair competition’ in their legitimizing narratives.  
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name of the individual right to ‘peace’ and ‘privacy’ and/or of the collective ‘right to 
housing’ and to ‘stay put’. But often they deem the new rules too mild or lacking ‘teeth’ 
because of poor enforcement resources or not enough pressures put on platforms.  
 
5) ‘Sharing economy’ intellectual advocates inspired by the initial theorisations of this 
movement seek to harness the technological innovation provided by platforms to 
encourage the activation of underused urban resources and simultaneously support 
objectives of economic growth, social cohesion, public participation and service co-
production (they were mostly present in the Milan case). 
 
6) Finally, corporate platforms, especially Airbnb, have played a dominant role in the 
local, regional or national politics of PM-STR regulation in the three cities, publicly 
invoking the ‘right to share’ (sometimes supported, at least initially, by pro-sharing 
economy intellectual advocates as in Milan), and the ‘right to travel’ (or mobility) 
(illustrated by Airbnb’s slogans “belong anywhere” and “live like a local”). 
 
With regard to corporate platforms, in our three cases they have developed intense political 
actions at various levels of government, confirming other studies such as McNeill, 2016. 
Relations between platforms and local governments have oscillated between “political 
exchange” (Pizzorno, 1978) and “policy conflict” (Dobbin, 2004). On the one hand, platforms 
have sought political recognition to reduce the regulatory risk inherent to the legal grey area 
in which their business operates, thus offering some degree of collaboration on particular 
aspects of policy implementation. This was the case with Airbnb in Milan and Paris in 2015 
and 2016. On the other hand, strong conflicts between platforms and public authorities also 
occurred. In July 2014 the Barcelona government fined Airbnb and seven other platforms 
€30,000 each, and in November 2016 Airbnb and Homeaway €600,000 each, for repeatedly 
advertising illegal listings despite warnings. Airbnb then expressed virulent critiques against 
the restrictive nature of the PEUAT in Barcelona, or the introduction of minimum regulatory 
requirements in Lombardy and the registration number in Paris. Moreover, Airbnb has 
developed new strategies of political influence based on the mobilisation of the platform’s 
individual users, who are encouraged to mobilise against attempts to regulate the sector - 
collectively via the above-mentioned “Home sharing clubs” and the platform’s dedicated 
policy website (airbnbcitizen.com), and individually via “protest” e-mails pre-drafted by 
Airbnb. Such practices are not unique to Airbnb, but common to several corporate actors in 
the platform economy (see Thelen, 2018, on Uber). Airbnb and other major platforms thus act 
as ‘regulatory entrepreneurs’ (Pollman and Barry, 2017), and, we argue, have become a new 
significant urban governance actor. Beyond the intense political actions of the platform at the 
local level, further analysis of this new ‘regulatory entrepreneurship’ is necessary at upper 
levels of government - in particular at the EU level, which is becoming an increasingly 
important battleground for regulation as platforms turn to the European E-Commerce 
Directive and Services Directive to contest new regulations (Corporate Europe Observatory, 
2018). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The development of digital platforms has greatly facilitated the proliferation of short-term 
rentals, a type of economic activity and urban land use which previously existed in limited 
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forms. This has contributed to change global mobility patterns, opened new markets for real 
estate investment and rent extraction, and challenged traditional modes of regulation, forcing 
public institutions to deal with informal, hard-to-measure practices and new transnational 
companies. PM-STR thus reveal a new facet of the influence of corporate capitalism over 
cities. Comparative work on these issues is crucial to understand how different countries and 
cities are ‘confronting the challenges posed by the advent of digital capitalism’ in very 
different ways (Thelen, 2018: 939). The paper analysed how and why the city governments of 
Barcelona, Paris and Milan developed different regulatory responses to this transnational 
phenomenon. The comparison allowed us to identify three factors that contribute to explain 
different regulatory responses: the type of actors who mobilised in the first place, multi-level 
government arrangements and pre-existing policy instruments. Furthermore, we identified 
the main actors involved, and the different types of interests and rights which are 
counterposed, in the contentious politics of PM-STR regulation. Conflicts emerge in all cities 
around who has a ‘right’ to live in/enjoy the city and to get a share of the benefits of ‘platform 
capitalism’, and around the rationale and conditions under which the right to use one’s 
property or to freely carry out an economic activity can be curtailed or regulated. 
 
Our comparative analysis of the development of responses by different actors adds richness 
to the scholarship on ‘platform economies’ and urban change by providing a grounded 
understanding of the emergence and consolidation of place-specific discursive framings and 
policy responses to the issue of PM-STR. It shows that new forms of corporate ‘digital 
capitalism’ do not land homogeneously upon cities, and calls for further comparative analyses 
of local processes of actors’ mobilization, collective action, and modes of regulation of digital 
platforms. City (and other tiers of) governments may not be completely powerless in the face 
of new transnational digital corporations, although they are struggling to deal and negotiate 
with them. The future effectiveness of regulations depends on the success of the pressures 
put by public actors – at multiple tiers of government, including the EU – on platforms for 
access to data and regulatory compliance. While there was no scope here to elaborate on this 
crucial question, the challenges of ‘governing without data’ - or with imperfect data - in the 
age of global digital capitalism and privately-produced big data (Courmont & Le Galès, 2019) 
should be a central focus of contemporary urban studies scholarship. 
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Table 1 
 Barcelona Paris Milan 
Population1 
 
1,620,809 (2017) 
(Greater City 3,648,483) 
2,220,445 (2014) 
(Greater City 6,754,282) 
1,351,562 (2017) 
(Greater City 4,087,060) 
Area (surface) 101.9 km² 105.4 km² 181.8 km² 
Total number of housing units2 811,106 (2011) 1,300,000 (2016) 643,053 (2011) 
Structure of housing stock3 
% of social/affordable housing 
% of home ownership 
% of privately rented housing 
 
5.9% (2011) 
64% (2011) 
30,1% (2011) 
 
19,9% (2016) 
33,2% (2015) 
44% (2014) 
 
5.5% (2016) 
59,6% (2001) 
34,9% (2001)  
% of vacant housing units4 10.9 % (2011) 7.3 % (2011) 6% (2011)  
Average rent in private sector5 10.3 €/m2/month (2015, Q1) 22.9 €/m2/month (2018) 24,8 €/m2/month (2018) 
Gross available average income / capita6 20,600 €/inhab. (2015) 26,431 €/household (2016) 20,968 €/inhab. (2013) 
Rate of unemployment7  17.82% (2011) 12.82% (2012) 6.97% (2011) 
Number of tourists (number of bednights)8  19.16 million (2016) 44.02 million (2016) 11.26 million (2016) 
Number of hotels 
Number of hotel rooms9 
653      
76,972 (2017) 
1,573  
80,617 (2017) 
467 
27,519 (2017) 
Number of Airbnb listings10 
 
12,000 (April 2015) 
18,346 (Nov. 2018) of which 
46.1% entire flats & 62.4% multi-listings  
25,000 (2015) 
59,881 (Dec. 2018) of which 
86.8% entire flats & 19.9% multi-listings 
6,403 (2014) 
17,659 (Nov. 2018) of which 
72,5% entire flats & 39.7% multi-listings 
Other estimates of STR numbers11 
 
 Licensed STR: from 824 in 2011 to 9,606 in 
2015 + unlicensed STR estimated at 6,275 in 
2015 = total 15,881 (July 2015) 
 January 2016: 78% of 14,699 Airbnb listings 
had no license number displayed 
 Total PM-STR estimate (2018): 100,000 
(60,000 Airbnb + 40,000 other platforms)  
 of which licensed STR (with registration 
number): 24,216 apartments (2018) 
 
 2018: registered apartments (CAV) represent 
no more than 10% of total Airbnb listings 
(1,841 CAV out of 17,657 listings) 
 
1 Eurostat, Urban Audit 
2 Idescat; INSEE; ISTAT 
3 Idescat; INSEE; ALER, ISTAT 
4 Idescat; INSEE; ISTAT 
5 Ajuntament de Barcelona, Estadística; Agence départementale d’information sur le logement (ADIL), Observatoire des loyers de l’agglomération parisienne (OLAP); Osservatorio Mercato 
Immobiliare (OMI), Agenzia delle Entrate 
6 Ajuntament de Barcelona, Estadística; INSEE; Ambrosetti, ANCI, Intesa San Paolo (2016) Start City. Il rilancio parte da qui. Fascicolo 7, p. 13. 
7 Centre for Cities Data Tool based on Eurostat Labour market statistics. 
8 European Cities Marketing Benchmarking Report 2017 
9 Ajuntament de Barcelona, Estadística; INSEE; Comune di Milano Open Data 
10 Inside Airbnb data, processed by: Arias Sans A and Quaglieri Domínguez A (2016) Unravelling Airbnb: Urban Perspectives from Barcelona. In AP Russo AP and G Richards (eds) Reinventing the Local 
in Tourism. Bristol: Channel View, pp. 209-228; http://www.simonblum.me/post/hacks/airbnb-paris; http://tomslee.net/category/airbnb-data  
11 Duatis J, Buhigas M and Cruz H (2016) Impacte del lloguer vacacional en el mercat de lloguer residencial de Barcelona. Barcelona: Ajuntament de Barcelona, based on Inside Airbnb; Department of 
Housing, City of Paris; Regione Lombardia Open Data 
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Table 2 
Cases Actors involved in the framing Policy framing 
Sectorial 
and 
business 
federation
s  
Residents’ 
associatio
ns or 
grassroots 
movement
s  
‘Sharing 
economy’ 
advocates  
P2P 
Platforms 
Governme
nt  
Main claims 
about STR 
(diagnostic)   
Main sector Policy 
demands 
(prognostic) 
Barcelon
a 
+ ++ 
Residents’ 
association
, new 
grassroots 
movement
s 
0 + 
Mainly 
Airbnb 
++ 
Municipal  
 
+ 
Regional 
PM-STR are 
part of 
excessive 
tourism 
flows, disturb 
daily life and 
the  housing 
market 
Tourism + 
Housing 
Almost 
prohibition 
and territorial 
redistribution 
Paris ++   
Hotel 
industry 
+ 
Conservati
onist 
residents 
association 
0  +  
Mainly 
Airbnb 
++   
Municipal  
 
PM-STR 
disturb the 
housing 
market 
Housing Agreement 
and 
regulation to 
control ‘bad’ 
STR 
Milan ++   
Hotel 
industry 
0 ++   
Academics, 
think tanks 
advising 
city 
governme
nt 
++  
Mainly 
Airbnb 
++  
Municipal  
 
++ 
Regional 
PM-STR are 
an economic 
opportunity/
a threat to be 
managed, 
regulated and 
taxed 
Sharing 
Economy, 
economic & 
social 
development 
(municipal 
level) 
 
Tourism 
(municipal & 
regional 
level)  
Registration 
and  taxation  
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Table 3 
 
Barcelona Paris Milano 
Tier(s) of government & 
policy sector 
Regional: tourism legislation (definition of 
‘accommodation for touristic use’) 
National: various pieces of legislation on tourism and 
housing (definition and conditions for commercial 
‘furnished tourist rentals’) and on the digital economy 
Regional: tourism legislation (definition of ‘holiday 
accommodation’) 
Municipal: urban planning: special land use / zoning 
plan (PEUAT) which limits licences for new STR in the 
city 
Municipal: housing regulations (change of use from 
residential to commercial) 
Municipal: economic development (‘sharing city’ 
strategy) 
Stringency / restrictive nature High Medium Light 
(i) Commercial STR of full 
property not used as a 
residence 
 
Allowed with a license. But de facto ban on new 
licenses in central areas of Barcelona since entry into 
force of PEUAT on 6 March 2017 (and very limited 
growth in other areas) 
Subject to municipal authorization for change of use 
(from residential to commercial) + compulsory 
compensation condition: acquire a commercial 
property elsewhere in city and convert it to residential 
use 
Allowed, subject to communication to Municipality.  
STR considered as commercial if more than 3 units 
rented or full-year rental. Tax regime of commercial 
activities 
(ii) Temporary rental of 
primary residence (in full) 
Allowed with a license. But de facto ban on new 
licenses in central areas of Barcelona since entry into 
force of PEUAT on 6 March 2017 (and very limited 
growth in other areas) 
Allowed up to 120 days per year subject to registration 
with Municipality 
Allowed, subject to communication to Municipality.  
STR considered as non-commercial if up to 3 units 
rented or if the rental is up to 275 days a year. Tax 
regime of non-commercial activities 
(iii) Home-sharing  Currently “a-legal”. New regional legislation under 
discussion, not approved yet: would create a legal 
definition for STR of rooms in a primary residence and 
give scope for municipalities to regulate 
Allowed up to 120 days per year subject to registration 
with Municipality 
Allowed, subject to communication to Municipality.  
STR considered as non-commercial if up to 3 units 
rented or the rental is up to 275 days a year. Tax regime 
of non-commercial activities 
Mandatory registration of 
activity/unit (with light 
conditions) 
Registration on Tourism Register of Catalonia 
+ Communication of activity to Municipality 
Type (i): Declaration of furnished tourist rental 
Type (ii) and (iii): since 2016, registration with 
Municipality 
Communication of start/end of activity to Municipality. 
The delivered Identification Code (CIR) must appear on 
listings and advertising (starting from Sept. 2018)  
Other restrictions/obligations - Owners’ association can decide blanket ban on use of 
flats as housing for touristic uses in a residential 
building through change in bylaws 
- For tenants: STR needs authorization from landlord  
- For landlords: authorization needed from owners’ 
association:  
- STR in social housing is prohibited 
- Obligation for hosts to communicate guests ID to the 
Police and to communicate tourist flows to the Region  
- Apartment and furniture standards for STR defined by 
law  
Agreements with platforms - Platforms obliged to inform hosts of local rules  
- June 2018: agreement with Airbnb to require newly-
signed hosts to include licence number and accept 
sharing of personal data with city and regional 
authorities  
 
- Platforms obliged to inform hosts of local rules and 
require them to include license number in ad 
- October 2015: Agreement with Airbnb for tourist tax 
collection via platform 
- April 2016: Airbnb sends out communications to hosts 
likely to be renting primary residence for more than 120 
days 
 
- Platforms obliged to inform hosts of local rules and 
require them to include the Identification Code 
- March 2018: Agreement with Airbnb for tourist tax 
collection via platform 
Enforcement 
 
Digital scraping, inspections  Digital scraping, inspections  Inspections 
28 
Staff: 40 ‘visualisers’ tracing online illegalities + 36 
inspectors from municipal Dep. of Urban Planning 
2017: 4,963 proceedings against illegal STR 
Staff: 29 inspectors from municipal Office of Housing 
Protection 
2017: 212 proceedings against illegal STR 
Staff: ~10 inspectors from the Budget and Revenues 
Dep.  
Channels for reporting 
illegalities 
Yes (online + phone) Yes (online) Not specific to STR  
Fines €3,000-€30,000 (for illegal STR operators) 
€30,000-€600,000 (for platforms not complying) 
€50,000 (for illegal STR operators) €2,000-€20,000 for illegal STR operators; €2,000 -
€10,000 for unfulfilled STR requirements; €500-€2,500 
for non-visible or fake code 
Other measures Online searchable register of licensed commercial STR 
Communication campaign on posters for tourists 
Public register of authorized commercial STR Online searchable register of licensed commercial STR  
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Figure 1 
 
